

worse among the Afghan National Police. Recruitment has been slow, attrition has been high, there are no non-commissioned officers, and many among the ranks are illiterate.

To build the ANA and ANP, we need to overcome limiting factors in the dearth of leadership development, qualified recruits, infrastructure, trainers, and equipment. During my trip to Helmand Province last month, I was struck by the side-by-side image of the Afghan Army troops in Toyota pickup trucks and U.S. troops in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, or MRAPs.

There is widespread recognition that there is a long way to go before the Afghan security forces can be self-sufficient and that the training plan requires adjustments.

We are now embedding American trainers with Afghan battalions to enhance leadership development, but we continue to do this better, which is why I strongly support Senator LEVIN's plan to prioritize and focus on training the Afghan Army and police. Specifically, I agree that we must expedite the training, equipping, and support for the army and police so they can double in size to 240,000 for the army and 160,000 for the police, not by 2013 but by 2012, and hopefully by the end of 2011. Based on my September trip to Afghanistan with Senators LEVIN and REED, I believe this training can be expedited with the necessary focus and resources. This must—I say, must—be a top priority because our overall goal is not nation building in Afghanistan; it is self-sufficiency for the Afghans so they can provide for their own security, much like what has happened in Iraq.

The third changed condition we must consider is recent developments in Pakistan. When I traveled there in April, the situation was grave. The tension between the Pakistani Government and the Taliban was mounting. The deal that was cut with the Taliban to relinquish control over Swat Valley was unraveling, the Frontier Corps did not have the capacity to “clear and hold” in the tribal areas and border region, and I walked away very concerned about the overall political situation.

Immediately after the trip, the Pakistani military took decisive action against the Taliban in Swat Valley and has since regained control of the area. With our help, the Frontier Corps is building its capacity, and we just passed the Kerry-Lugar legislation, which would triple economic aid to Pakistan.

On my most recent trip in September, it was clear the political security environment had improved, but I still remain concerned about al-Qaida and its allies continuing to use Pakistan as a safe haven.

As we review our mission—taking into account these three developments and changing conditions—we must also consider the strategy used to meet our objectives. In March, the President an-

nounced “an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy” for Afghanistan. Partnering with the population and training local security forces has proven to be the best way to defeat insurgencies over time. Let me repeat: Partnering with the population and training local security forces has proven to be the best way to defeat insurgencies over time. Therefore, the second principal question we must ask is, Do we have the requirements necessary for waging an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan?

Before I address these questions, let me say that I am struck—truly struck—by how quickly the military has adapted to counterinsurgency and how, from the bottom up, it has been adopted. Since General Petraeus wrote the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual in 2006, counterinsurgency has become fundamental to our military doctrine.

As long as we maintain the strength of our conventional forces, it is increasingly unlikely anyone will take on the U.S. military through conventional means. Let me repeat that. As long as we maintain the strength of our conventional forces, it is increasingly unlikely anyone will take on the U.S. military through conventional means. We must, therefore, prepare to fight future wars against insurgencies, nonstate actors, and asymmetrical forces. As such, the military, under the leadership of Secretary Gates, is rebalancing its budget and making other fundamental changes.

This is remarkable to me because any large organization, especially one as large as the U.S. military, is like a supertanker: it just does not turn easily. Through an incredible organizational effort, however, this supertanker has changed course, and I am truly impressed by the extent to which DOD and the U.S. military have accomplished this and have embraced counterinsurgency, from the privates to the four-star generals.

Counterinsurgency is a four-step process: First, shape a strategy; second, clear the area of insurgents; third, hold the area; and fourth, build through governance, essential services, and economic ability. It is important to note that troops are just one part of a counterinsurgency strategy. Equally important is training the indigenous security forces, providing essential services, promoting economic development, and strengthening systems of governance.

General McChrystal has recommended a full counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan. As he mentions in his report, we should not resource the mission without reconsidering the strategy, and focusing on troop levels or resources alone “misses the point entirely.” Therefore, I ask again, do we have the requirements for an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan? In order to explore this question, we must look at three key areas—governance, training, and the civilian

role—and ask the following questions: First, can the Afghan Government offer a winning alternative to the Taliban? Second, can we train enough Afghan troops and police to meet the required number of counterinsurgents? Third, do we have enough civilians? Finally, we must also consider how to develop an effective strategy for reintegrating low-level insurgents.

Counterinsurgency is about trust building between the local population, the security forces, and the government. Without trust, we cannot expect sustainable progress, and that is why I am particularly concerned about allegations of fraud in the Afghan elections.

If this were a political campaign, there would be no need to run negative ads against the Taliban. According to the polls, the Taliban has only 6 percent support among the Afghan population. This is the good news. The bad news is that in the absence of jobs, credible governance, and essential services, this does not translate into support for the Afghan Government by the Afghan people. This is why we cannot just target the Taliban or insurgents. We must help the government develop a capacity to provide for its people so it can be viewed as credible and effective.

This is why the outcome of the recent election must be resolved in a clear manner so that whatever trust remains between the Afghan people and the government is not further diminished. We must ask—can we succeed in a counterinsurgency with a Karzai government tainted by allegations of fraud and corruption? How do we recalibrate our strategy in light of the recent flawed elections?

The second question I would like to raise is about the amount of counterinsurgents we need to succeed. Counterinsurgency doctrine tells us that troop size is not determined by the size of the enemy, but rather, by the size of the population. As such, we need a ratio of one counterinsurgent for every 50 citizens. The latest CIA World Factbook estimates the population of Afghanistan at 28 million, which means that we need roughly 560,000 “boots on the ground” which includes Afghans, NATO troops, and Americans.

During our visit, we learned that there have been 94,000 Afghan National Army and 82,000 Afghan National Police trained as of August. This brings the total number of trained Afghans to slightly less than 200,000. Combine this with 68,000 U.S. troops by the end of the year, and 38,000 NATO forces, and we have reached nearly 300,000. This is slightly more than half of the requisite number of troops, and is overly-generous in assuming that all trained Afghan security forces are combat ready and effective. Just by comparison, in Iraq, a country of two-thirds the size, there are already more than 600,000 trained security forces.

No one is suggesting we fill this enormous vacuum with American troops,